Proceedings of the 50th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences | 2017

Insider Misuse Identification using Transparent Biometrics
Nathan Clarke1,2, Fudong. Li1, Abdulrahman. Alruban1,3, Steven. Furnell1,2,4
Centre for Security, Communications and Network Research, Plymouth University, Plymouth, UK
2
Security Research Institute, Edith Cowan University, Perth, Western Australia
3
Computer Sciences and Information Technology College, Majmaah University Majmaah, Saudi Arabia
4
School of Information and Communication Technology, Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, Port Elizabeth,
South Africa
N.Clarke@Plymouth.ac.uk
1

Abstract
Insider misuse is a key threat to organizations.
Recent research has focused upon the information
itself – either through its protection or approaches to
detect the leakage. This paper seeks a different
approach through the application of transparent
biometrics to provide a robust approach to the
identification of the individuals who are misusing
systems and information. Transparent biometrics are a
suite of modalities, typically behavioral-based that can
capture biometric signals covertly or non-intrusively –
so the user is unaware of their capture. Transparent
biometrics are utilized in two phases a) to imprint
digital objects with biometric-signatures of the user
who last interacted with the object and b) uniquely
applied to network traffic in order to identify users
traffic (independent of the Internet Protocol address)
so that users rather than machine (IP) traffic can be
more usefully analyzed by analysts. Results from two
experimental studies are presented and illustrate how
reliably transparent biometrics are in providing this
link-ability of information to identity.

1. Introduction
Insider misuse have become widespread in the last
decade and has been considered an important security
issue by many recent research studies [1-6]. Whilst
much research has been undertaken into the detection
of insider misuse and particularly information leakage,
less focus has been attributed to linking this to the
people who are committing the criminal activity.
Assuming many will utilize stolen credentials from
colleagues to perpetrate the misuse, there is frequently
a reliance upon other security controls to verify the
identity of the person responsible (i.e. through the use
of logs, CCTV etc), if indeed this is possible at all.
This paper focusses upon the application of
transparent biometrics to the problem of insider misuse
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in two differing scenarios that together provide robust
identity verification, enabling incident analysts and/or
forensic examiners a reliable, efficient and effective
process for identifying the responsible individual. The
first phase deals with the problem of understanding
who is actually responsible for leaking the information.
As a user interacts with a computer, biometric signals
are capture covertly (enabling biometric techniques
such as facial recognition, keystroke analysis,
behavioral profiling, iris recognition) to be imprinted
within the digital object being used. In this manner, all
digital objects will be covertly imprinted with the
biometric signature of the user who has last interacted
with it. Upon detection of the misuse, the biometric
signature can be recovered and this will identify the
individual who sent it – negating the need for
expensive and time consuming investigation of system.
Having identified the user, an investigator will want to
understand what else the user has been up to.
Organizational network traffic logs provide an
independent basis for understanding this – however,
due to the mobile nature of the workforce and the
nature of DHCP, it has long been understood that IP is
not a reliable means of filtering traffic. The use of
multiple devices further compounds the issue as the
device will be given differing IP addresses upon each
connection. The second phase, utilizes a novel feature
extraction process and applies behavioral profiling to
the network traffic to provide investigators with all the
traffic associated with a particular user (rather than
machine), enabling a far more efficient analysis of user
activity.
The paper is structured with Section 2 providing an
overview of the background literature in insider misuse
and transparent biometrics. Section 3 describes the
system architecture and processes that underpin the
approach. Section 4 presents two sets of experiments to
illustrate the feasibility of applying transparent
biometrics focused around both phases. Section 5
presents a discussion with Section 6 providing the
concluding remarks and direction of the future work.
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2. Background
2.1. Insider Misuse
Typically, there are three main types of threats that
insiders could commit, Internet technology sabotage,
insider theft of intellectual property and insider fraud.
The majority of research within the field has been
focused upon the detection rather than the response.
Several academic studies were published with the aim
of combating the issue of insider misuse. Some studies
have tried to use biometric information as a factor for
detecting the malicious activities of an insider by
measuring the individual’s biometric signals and in
particular when they change, for example Heart Rate
Variability (HRV), core body temperature, and skin
temperature [7]. The authors claim that there is a
correlation between these signals change and
individual’s
malicious
intent.
Clearly
their
experimental setup is rather controversial, and there is
neither a distinct nor strong correlation between their
hypotheses or the actual implementation to the data
loss
detection/prevention.
Other
researchers
investigated the feasibility of linking persons with the
leakage incidents by inserting a fake data (object) into
the confidential data that they want to protect [8-11].
However, such an approach is not a simple task to
achieve, even with methods such as the guilt
identification model, which is designed precisely for
the case when a data distributor has given sensitive
information to a group of supposedly trusted agents.
Other authors proposed monitoring systems that
operate proactively for forensic and audit purposes [1215]. While such techniques could provide
comprehensive logs and detailed information about
actions performed by the user, it fails to biometrically
link an incident to those individuals who conducted
them. Indeed, there is no current literature that has
specifically sought to transparently embed biometric
signatures in digital objects. Whilst the use of network
traffic to identify individuals has been the focus of
many studies, results have not been encouraging due to
the level of noise and the uniqueness of features being
utilized in the biometric system [16-19]. They have
tended to use very raw features such as individual
packet or flow-based information or even source IP –
which is not appropriate. The approach in this paper is
to apply the extensive knowledge of transparent
biometrics to develop a unique set of features from raw
network metadata that are focused specifically upon
the user.

2.2. Transparent Biometrics

With the aim of providing continuous protection for
IT services and their data, a number of research studies
were conducted to investigate the use of biometrics for
transparent and non-intrusive authentication over the
last 15 years. For example, a thin-client based topology
is proposed by [20] that utilized face recognition to
enable transparent authentication on mobile devices;
while DARPA proposed an Active Authentication
research program aiming to address the problem of the
point-of-entry technique by utilizing behavioral-based
biometrics for desktop computing [21]. Based upon
their characteristics (either physiological or behavioral
based), details of existing studies on transparent
biometrics are presented in the following subsections.
2.2.1. Physiological Transparent Biometrics. The
physiological biometric based systems utilize the
characteristics of a human body part (e.g. fingerprint
and face) to identify individuals. In general,
physiological biometric characteristics contain high
levels of discriminatory information and are resistant to
various factors (e.g. age, body fitness or the weather
conditions). Traditionally, physiological biometric
techniques are solely used as an alternative point of
entry authentication method. With the advancement of
sensors, several transparent authentication techniques
started to emerge. [22] and [20] utilized face
recognition to provide continuous and transparent
authentication for desktops and mobile devices
respectively. [23] proposed a fast and fully automatic
ear recognition approach based on 3D local surface
features for generic usage; while [24] investigated an
implicit authentication technique based upon ear
shapes during a call session on smartphones. By using
touch screens, [25] and [26] demonstrated that
fingerprint identification can be utilized to provide
transparent and continuous protection for mobile
devices. In addition, the use of iris recognition (one of
the most accurate biometric technique) for real-time
continuous authentication was also investigated [27].
2.2.2.
Behavioral
Transparent
Biometrics.
Behavioral biometrics identifies a person based upon
their unique behavior, such as the way they type on a
keyboard. In contrast with physiological biometric
techniques, behavioral based methods are less unique
as human behaviors tend to change over time due to
various reasons (e.g. social environment or mood);
however they are more flexible and user-friendly,
hence a natural candidate for transparent
authentication. Indeed, researchers have been carried
out a number of studies. Initially, the two most
common user behaviors with the computing
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environment (i.e. the use of mouse and keyboard) were
investigated for the purpose of continuously and nonintrusively authenticating users: mouse dynamics [2832] and keystroke analysis [33-35]. Then, with the
prevalence of mobile devices, several new behavioral
biometrics were explored for the same purpose (i.e.
transparent authentication), including voice verification
[36, 37], gait recognition [38, 39] and behavioral
profiling [40].
The field of transparent biometrics has become
more established in recent years with a significant
focus upon the development of more reliable
modalities and the underlying management system that
provides a degree of intelligent context support.

3. A Proactive and Reactive Approach
As illustrated in Figure 1, the core of the
architecture is built around the capturing, processing
and classification of biometric signals derived from
built-in sensors within the computing technology that
can be captured without the explicit interaction by the
user. The transparent, continuous and multimodal
capture of the biometric signals is key to mitigating
against forgery [41]. Whilst a perpetrator might be able
to steal password credentials or even forge a biometric,
to do so continuously and against a wide-range of
modalities is extremely challenging (there are few
studies that have successfully hacked a multibiometric
system let alone a continuous and transparent
multibiometric system). This provides for a strong
basis of ensuring it is the user who is using the system

whose biometrics are captured rather than someone
they might be masquerading to be.
The source of biometric signals differs depending
upon the proactive or reactive approach. The proactive
is focused upon the capture and analysis of signals
captured via the client computer. The reactive
approach is focused upon deriving a behavioral-based
profile from the network traffic.

3.1. Proactive
Imprinting

Approach

–

Biometric

The proactive approach focuses upon establishing a
reliable correlation between individuals and the digital
object (e.g. an email, an image file or a document) that
is being used. This correlation is achieved by mapping
the hexadecimal representations of the extracted
biometric features of the user with the hexadecimal
representations of the object. This process generates a
digital imprint file representing locations within the
object, each of which corresponds to a respective
portion of the extracted biometric features.
These corresponding locations are the main element
of the resulted imprint file and with perhaps some extra
information (e.g. object metadata, timestamp).
Thereby, the imprint file does not carry any direct
biometric signal but rather the locations that
correspond to the biometric signal.
Since any file type can be represented in
hexadecimal form, this makes the proposed method a
generic approach that works with any object type—as
long as it is in form of a digital object.

Figure 1: Insider Misuse Identification Architecture
The generated imprints are then stored in a
website or captured by the network) can be analyzed
centralized database for later use when needed. For
for extracting the imprinted biometric signals by
instance, upon the detection of misuse such as data
reversing the mapping process. Hence, an investigator
leakage, the object (whether it is posted on a public
could establish the identity of the user who interacted
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with the object by processing the extracted biometric
feature with the biometric system and compared
against the database of users.

3.2.
Reactive
Fingerprinting

Approach

–

Network

The reactive part of the insider misuse
identification architecture (i.e. network fingerprinting)
aims to identify individual users via their interactions
of various network-based services, assisting
investigators to narrow down the pool of potential
suspects when an incident occurs. In order for the
network fingerprinting technique to work accurately,
two critical processes need to be completed: the
extraction from raw traffic of user interactions
(application-level descriptions of user interactions
rather than raw traffic) which form the template and
the identification strategy used to classify and link
network traffic.
During the template creation stage, users use their
network services (e.g., Facebook, Google) and the
Feature Extraction function extracts various metadata
information, including the date and time stamps and
various header information of the IP packet (e.g.,
sender and receiver’s IP address and port numbers, the
size of the packet) and the User Interactions function
derives interaction signatures on different user
activities within network based services. The novelty
of this approach is unlike current research that focusses
upon which service a user might user (e.g. Facebook)
and for how long, these user interactions are able to
discern more discreet information as to what the user
was doing whilst using the service (e.g. messaging on
Facebook, watching a video, reading the all). This
additional granularity of user-specific information
provides a richer source of discriminative information.
In order to ensure the template quality, sufficient
network data is required to be collected over a period
time; also, due to the nature of the behavioral biometric
technique, the template will be regularly renewed.
The user identification process is required when an
incident occurs. During this process, all network
metadata related to the incident will be analyzed.
Similar to the template creation process, the network
traffic metadata is utilized by Feature Extraction
function and then the User Interactions function. These
interactions are then compared to the template database
to obtain a probabilistic identification.
Once the identification process is completed, the
network traffic will be prioritized based upon the
identification outcome and visualized according to
identified users. In this way, the investigator can make
a sensible decision upon which part of the network
traffic should be focused first.

4. Experimental Analysis
In order to assess the feasibility of the utilizing
transparent in this proactive and reactive manner, two
experiments were devised to investigate the core
functionality.

4.1. Proactive Biometric Imprinting
The ability to capture, extract and imprint a digital
object with a transparent biometric signature is not a
technically challenging task (and is already the subject
of a patent by the authors [42]). The key research
question with respect to the imprinting of the biometric
signature is how robust is the approach given
subsequent modification of the digital object. As such
the following two experiments were undertaken that
simulate two types of attacks that might occur to a
digital object after the imprinting process has occurred:
• The first experiment simulates the case where the
imprinted image was modified in several parts.
This type of attack is very influential since various
and random parts of the image are affected by such
alterations. The modified parts are determined
randomly (an example of which is shown in Figure
2).
• The second attack scenario simulates the case of
when only part of the imprinted image is available
and the rest is missing; for instance, the imprinted
image could be resized or cropped. To simulate
such alterations, a random section of the images in
the dataset was cropped in different sizes after
been imprinted. Figure 3 illustrates an example of
some of these cropped samples.

Figure 2: Sample of a modified multiple parts
of an image
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Figure 3: Samples of a cropped image in
certain percentage
In the experiments, the feature vector used is a real
facial feature vector sample with a length of 57
numeric characters, as illustrated in Figure 4. The
length of the vector does vary but this is fairly
representative of the type and length of information
that would need embedding. In this study, Fisherfaces
algorithm is used to generate the feature vector for the
captured users’ faces images [43]. The UCID image
dataset version 2 is used for to simulate both attacks
and evaluates the performance of the proposed
technique [44]. For the purpose of this study, only the
first 100 images are used from this dataset, since it is
assumed that this number is enough for the purpose of
evaluation. Each of the 100 images was modified from
0 to 100% and whether the feature vector could be
retrieved noted.

Figure 4: Facial feature vector
The experimental results show that the imprinted
feature vectors are successfully retrieved, even when
the images are altered in a significant manner. Figure 5
illustrates the averaged percentage of images where the
feature vector was successfully retrieved. The printing
of the black boxes (signifying modification) does
consequently affect the mapped indexes’ values.
Therefore, many of the imprints become useless after
such an attack. However, despite massive destruction
on the image with the increased rate of the
modification, it is possible to recapture the feature
vector from some of those images, even up to 95%
modification with some images.

Figure 5: Number of images with successful
retrieved feature vectors under multiple parts
modification attack

Figure 6: partial image attack
In the second experiment, the results show the
feature vector is retrieved and reassembled 100%
among all the tested images. This means that by giving
only part of the original imprinted image (as small as
5% of the original file), it is possible to restore the
feature vector to its original state. In addition, the
results in Figure 6 shows that the average, maximum,
and minimum numbers of a retrieved feature vector
cross on all examined images (i.e. 100 images).
However, these results were obtained by assuming that
the preserved indexes of the hexadecimal values of
interest are not changed after the cropping process.
This means that all of the imprints in the database are
correlated with the questioned samples as a part of the
original images. In practice this is not always possible
since the original object might not be accessible or
available after the imprinting process took a place.

4.2.
Reactive
Fingerprinting

Approach

-

Network

Users can perform a wide range of activities within
different online services, such as reading news, sending
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emails, editing documents, and chatting with friends. If
users were “profilable” based upon their interactions
with online services (i.e. not only knowing which
service they are using but also what they are doing
with the service such as uploading pictures, listening to
audio, watching a video, instant messaging) rather than
merely relying upon their IP addresses (as the current
state of the art presents), it would be easier for network
security analysts to track down involved individuals
when an incident occurs.
The novel approach to feature extraction seeks to
remove the noise and low-level information created at
the packet-level and attempt to derive application –
level user interactions. Based upon this hypothesis, 9
Internet services (i.e. BBC, Dropbox, Facebook,
Google, Hotmail, Twitter, Skype, YouTube and
Wikipedia) were selected due to their popularity [45].
Various user actions within each aforementioned
service were performed and their corresponding
network signals were collected via Wireshark. In order
to increase the accuracy of the analysis, each user
action was manually tested 20 times by three
individual researchers to explore the relationship
between user actions with their network signals. A list
of network metadata parameters were utilized for the
analysis: the date and time stamp, the IP addresses of
source and destination, their port numbers, protocol ID
(either TCP or UDP), the length of a datagram, and
several TCP flags (e.g. SYN, FIN, ACK and PUSH).
In general, user actions can be represented in three
forms via their network metadata: a single packet,
multiple packets and a stream of packets [46]. When a
user action is carried out, 1) only one packet is sent to
the server; 2) 2-4 packets which are sent to the server
within less than a one-millisecond timeframe; 3) a
stream of packets (with similar payload size) that are
sent to the server within 100 microseconds one after
another . Table 1 illustrates the results of this process
and also describes in detail the form that each
interaction pattern in each application.
In total, 46 users completed the data collection
process during the period of 12 November 2014 to 11
January 2015. Also, ethical approval was obtained
from the Faculty Research Ethics Committee of the
authors’ university. A total of 112 Gigabytes of IP
header information was accumulated. Each user’s data
is stored in an individual SQLite database file; also,
each record contains the following fields: a time and
date stamp (e.g. 2015.01.15.22:38:05.587341),
sender’s IP address and port number, receiver’s IP
address and port number, the packet length, the type of
traffic (e.g. TCP) and the flags (e.g. SYN and FIN).
Based upon the above observation from Table 1, a
user’s interaction databases were created for each of

the 9 chosen Internet services (as illustrated in Table
2). In total, 5,285,384 activities records across 9
services were collected from the 46 users during the
aforementioned experimental period.
Table 1: User Actions Derived from 9 chosen
services
User
Interactions

Total
length
(bytes)

Directions

Stream

Various

Server > Client

Stream

~MTU

Server > Client

~MTU

Server > Client

No. of
packets
BBC

Page
navigation
Watching
video
Listening to
audio

Stream

Dropbox
Download
files
Upload files
Folder
navigations
Page loading
Attach files
Chat
Typing
Page
navigation
Editing
File
attachments
Compose an
email
Insert a
recipient

Stream

~MTU

Server > Client

Stream

~MTU

Client > Server

Two

155

Client > Server

Facebook
Stream
Various
One
~MTU
2
2,625+
2
1,502
Google
Multiple

Server > Client
Server > Client
Client > Server
Client > Server

268

Server > Client

Multiple
270
Hotmail

Server > Client

Stream

~MTU

Client > Server

One

981

Server > Client

One

917

Client > Server
Client > Server
Both Clients
Both Clients
Sending Client>
receiving client

Skype
Text messages
Audio calls
Video calls

One
Stream
Stream

794+
129-147
1165-1365

File transfer

Stream

~MTU

One

731

Client> Server

One

572

Client > Server

Click on
contacts
Idle
Tweet
Upload
Click contact
Ideal / Reading
Viewing
Watch videos
Upload videos

Twitter
One
192+
Stream
~MTU
One
747
Multiple
625+
Wikipedia
Stream
~MTU
YouTube
Stream
~MTU
Stream
~MTU

Client > Server
Client > Server
Client > Server
Server > Client
Server > Client
Server > Client
Client > Server
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Table 2: An Overview of User Interactions with
Each Service
Services
BBC
Dropbox
Facebook
Google
Hotmail
Skype
Twitter
Wikipedia
YouTube

Users
30
31
46
46
45
31
46
44
45

Single
9.64%
71.21%
63.53%
60.09%
67.99%
73.62%
56.70%
12.00%
44.39%

Multiple
15.60%
26.51%
30.95%
34.39%
28.20%
14.48%
35.34%
31.81%
43.26%

Stream
74.76%
2.28%
5.52%
5.52%
3.81%
11.89%
7.96%
56.19%
12.35%

Total
36,994
108,168
1,619,741
878,434
227,469
260,623
172,213
14,720
1,967,022

In order to successfully identify users through their
service interactions, a classifier that can discriminate
individual users based upon their behavioral activities
is required. Several Artificial Intelligence (AI)
techniques, including Feedforward Multi-Layer
Perceptron (FF MLP) neural network, Radial Basis
Function (RBF) neural network, and Self-Organising
Map (SOM), can be utilized for this purpose. Amongst
them, FF MLP was chosen as the default classifier
based upon its previous performance within the
transparent authentication domain [40, 47, 48].
With the aim of investigating the feasibility of
identifying users via their network activities, a set of
experiment was conducted upon the 9 Internet services
of the 46 users’ two month data. The experiment was
carried out within the Matlab R2013a environment on
a Windows 7 Enterprise 64-bit Operating System with
Intel Core i7-2600 CPU (3.4 GHz) and 16 GB
memory. Based upon the outcome of some initial
testing, a network size of 40 neurons FF MLP with the
trainlm training function was utilized. In order to
ensure sufficient data for both training and validation
processes, a minimum 200 of user interactions were set
for each service; also, a fixed size (i.e. 60% of the
predefined threshold) was set to the training data that
was randomly selected; while if uneven data sizes were
chosen, a bias would be introduced by the neural
network towards those with more training samples.
Moreover, all features apart from the user’s IP address
were used from each record as the input vector;
obviously, a classifier would not be required if the
user’s IP address were utilized due to it is distinct
uniqueness within the given dataset. As the classifier
was configured in the identification mode, the True
Positive Identification Rate (TPIR) is used to measure
the performance accuracy. By using this setup, a set of
experiments were conducted on all users and services
and each configuration was repeated 5 times, and the
average performance was calculated.
Once the experiment was completed, the result for
each user’s all services was accumulated to check the
overall performance. In general, the average TPIR is
47.5%, respectively for all users’ all services,

suggesting almost half of the network traffic activities
can be identified to individual user by using user’s
interaction. In addition, a breakdown of the results for
each user is illustrated in Table 3. The Table contains
the user IDs, the Total Number of User Interactions
(TNUI) during the chosen period, and the performance.
The table is sorted based upon the user ID. The best
and worst performance was 86.3% and 12.6% (in terms
of TPIR), achieved by users 40 and 2 respectively.
Table 3: Overall identification results for each
user with all services
User
ID
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

TNUI
9,835
82,165
27,666
441,831
104,086
58,469
72,374
83,873
310,364
34,310
40,496
171,949
50,776
34,337
147,776
8,492
1,992
24,701
71,610
118,655
28,328
732
64,955

TPIR
(%)
62.8
12.6
32.8
19.2
69.2
51.5
23.1
43.8
42.9
39.1
39.6
26.8
42.7
42.2
39.2
29.9
59.4
41.6
49.7
28.6
16
47
29

User
ID
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46

TNUI
97,688
16,936
36,248
21,828
24,232
296,048
111,951
65,628
319,239
961,357
206,768
95,501
150,750
26,297
113,918
137,543
2,270
104,722
16,662
13,952
97,848
290,472
87,754

TPIR
(%)
81.8
54.7
27.1
67.1
41
43.4
45.9
51.6
68.6
51.9
32.9
73.7
56.4
51
31.1
59.6
86.3
56.7
73.9
46
64.1
63.5
67.4

The objective of this study was not to obtain perfect
identification but rather seek to reduce the volume of
traffic an investigator would have to analyze – a
reduction on average of half is excellent.

5. Discussion
The use of transparent biometrics to support the
proactive and reactive identification of insider misuse
is a flexible and robust approach to providing a strong
link between information and the use of information by
employees. The experiments performed into biometric
imprinting within digital objects focused upon its
ability to robustly embed and retrieve a biometric
signature even after significant modification – an
expectation in many cases of information leakage.
Using stenographic approaches, the experiments have
shown it is possible, even with 95% of the image
having been modified. The experiments into the
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reactive identification of users from network traffic has
also shown that up to 86% of traffic can be
successfully attributed – which provides for a huge
reduction in traffic analysis. Used alongside IP address,
which for small windows of time can be assumed to
come from the same user, provides for a very effective
approach reducing the volume of data to be analyzed.
Furthermore, these techniques could also be utilized
together to provide further verification that the digital
object imprinted by a user was indeed sent by the same
user (although albeit to a lower confidence).
That said, there a number of challenges that exist
that require further research to investigate:
• the ability to utilise a wider range of digital
objects. Differing objects have varying degrees of
stability due to their structure. For example, word
documents and their underlying data structure can
change considerably given small alterations to a
file. Therefore, alternative approaches need to be
developed that overcome this (e.g. the use of
higher-level objects whose orientation does not
move)
• the use of multibiometric signals within the
imprinting process. How much data can reliable be
imprinted and what effect will this have when the
file is modified. It is expected there will be a tradeoff between the volume of imprinted data and the
percentage a digital object can be modified.
• the identification performance that can be
achieved within a multibiometric system – using
multi-instance, multi-sample and in the proactive
approach multimodal techniques.
• how to apply both classification and logic to user
interactions to further reduce the volume of traffic
that needs to be analyse
• visualisation techniques that can present,
interrogate and interact with digital objects and
network traffic to provide a responsive and user
friendly forensic tool
• the scalability and performance characteristics of
an operational system. How much processing is
required to parse and present the data. Can the
system achieve near real-time visualisation of user
traffic? This begins to turn the reactive approach
also into a more proactive SIEM based approach.
It is worth highlighting in both approaches, there is
not a need (although potentially desirable) to verify the
identity perfectly/correctly. The approaches exist to
narrow the focus of an investigation to a subset of
individuals who investigators can then focus upon in
more upon. So even in cases where the perpetrator was
not listed first in the identification process, as long as
their name appears towards the top of the list, this
would provide the capability for investigators to more
quickly identify the guilty and build a case of evidence

against them. In organizations with large volumes of
employees this will be particularly useful.

6. Conclusions and Future Work
The paper has presented a holistic approach to aid
an incident analyst in establishing and investigating a
case of insider misuse – particularly with respect to
information leakage, although the reactive approach
would be useful in all cases. The resulting experiments
performed to validate the fundamental approach have
proved very encouraging.
The ability to identify an individual is however
largely dependent upon the performance of the
underlying biometric modalities utilized and further
work is required on developing these individually and
in the case of the proactive approach also
multimodal/multibiometric models. Further work will
also be undertaken into investigating the capabilities
with regards to forgability and circumventabilty in
order to ensure the system is robust against targeted
attack.
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